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Abstract 
 
In this project, I examine the consequences of the implementation of a state-system based 
on nationalism In Turkey after the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire. Afterwards, the 
concept and implementation of nation-state system is being discussed against Abdullah 
Öcalan’s idea of democratic confederalism.  
When Turkey became a recognized modern nation-state, they ended the old past with the 
undeveloped Ottoman Empire and welcomed a future with westernization and 
development. The new state was built upon Turkish nationalism and secularism inspired 
by the western notions of nation-state, nationalism and secularism. The new nation-state 
went through administrative, structural and social reforms, but the reforms, which 
supposed to develop the country, was undemocratic. These reforms resulted in the 
oppression of the two largest groups in Turkey, the Kurds and the Islamic Ummah. This 
caused numerous problems and conflicts between the state and the two groups. 
This led me to the discussion of whether the nation-state building in Turkey was a wrong 
decision and if democratic confederalism is an alternative to this system. 
The nation-state’s emphasize on nationalism has resulted in undemocratic reforms, that 
has oppressed the groups that did not belong to the ruling elite and those who did not 
have the right cultural and ethnical characteristics. 
With the idea of democratic confederalism Öcalan suggests a new system that can 
represent the interest of all the groups within society. Democratic confederalism, in theory, 
seems to be a more democratic system that includes all part of society and thus is an 
alternative to the nation-states in the Middle East.  
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Introduction 
 
With the Treaty of Lausanne signed, in 1923, Turkey became a recognized modern nation-
state. The new state was built of the remnants of the Ottoman Empire, and went through 
administrative, structural and social reforms. The western notions of nation-state, 
nationalism and secularism inspired the republican elite, who ruled the new Turkey. These 
notions were implemented within the constitution and the social order, but had 
consequences for the religious groups and non-Turkish minorities. The idea that a state, 
based on Turkish nationalism and secularism, was the most efficient approach to state-
building was pursued. This new republic was the ending of the old and undeveloped 
Ottoman Empire, but it did not end the issues that occurred in the last period of the 
Ottoman Empire and still existed when the republic was declared. 
Pursuing westernization, the republican elite implemented undemocratic nationalist and 
secular reforms. The Islamic Ummah and the Kurds were the two main groups 
representing large part of the Turkish society, but they were also the two groups, who was 
excluded from the decision-making by the republican. And these undemocratic reforms 
had severe consequences for these two groups. 
Among other things, Turkish secularism has meant banning of religious orders and dress 
codes for public servant. The Turkish model of secularism introduced radical institutional 
changes at the executive and legislative levels, such as the abolition of the Sultanate and 
the Caliphate in 1923; the abolition of religious courts and religious titles; the adoption of a 
secular civil code of law, and the declaration that the Turkish republic was a “secular state” 
by a constitutional amendment in 1937. The state delegitimized religious education and 
established the supremacy of the secular modern education nation-wide. The building of 
the nation-state was thus accompanied by the centralization of education and the 
formation of its nationalist elites. The Arabic language and script was banned. All these 
changes meant that the Islamic Ummah lost their legitimacy and right to be a part of the 
decision-making.  
As for the Kurds, the nationalist reforms denied their existence and ethnical origin. As 
Arabic, the Kurdish language was banned. They were not allowed to be in the Grand 
National Assembly of Turkey, and therefore could not be a part of the decision that 
concerned them. As a result of that, a Kurdish rebellion started. This resistance against the 
nationalist state continues this day leading by the PKK.  
 
 
Abdullah Öcalan, the leader of the PKK, has introduced the idea of democratic 
confederalism in connection with the peace-talk between the PKK and the Turkish 
government, which he thinks is the solution to the Kurdish issue in the Middle East.   
 
1. Problem Area 
 
In 1978 young socialist Kurds and Turks founded the PKK after a two-day long founding 
meeting. The party was named Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan (Kurdistan Workers Party), and 
was based on a socialist / communist ideology. Abdullah Öcalan, also known as Apo, was, 
and still is, the party leader. The aim of the party was a Kurdish state through which they 
could assign the Kurds the rights they had been deprived of by the imperialist powers that 
had occupied the area in which the party viewed as being the land of Kurds, Kurdistan. 
According to the Party, Kurdistan had been divided into four parts by the occupying 
powers Turkey, Iraq, Iran and Syria after the first World War, when the Ottoman Empire 
was dissolved and the remains of it was divided into the modern states in the Middle East, 
as we know them today.  
From the beginning of the 1980, the PKK started the preparations of their armed struggle. 
The Party began to train their first militant groups (40-50 people) in Lebanon. The aim was 
to send these trained militants back to Turkey in order to develop the armed struggle in the 
Kurdistan region. By 1982, the PKK had built a force of 300 guerilla fighters. These 
militants were sent to South Kurdistan (Northern Iraq), close to the Turkish border and 
constructed bases in the mountainous area. Until 1984, the PKK mainly undertook 
reconnaissance activities, infiltrating into Northern Kurdistan (eastern and southeastern 
Turkey) in small groups of four-five guerilla fighters (Jongerden & Akkaya, 2011: 130).  
On 15 August 1984, the PKK attacked the towns of Eruh (Siirt province) and Semdinli 
(Hakkari province) in Turkey. In Eruh, one soldier lost his life and six were wounded. In 
Semdinli, officer housing and a military guard post were shot at with machine guns and 
rockets. Several soldiers and officers were killed and wounded. This was the PKK’s official 
launch of the people’s war under the leadership of the PKK, and the announcement of the 
armed struggle against what was called the colonial fascist Turkish state.  
 
 
The liberation war (people’s war) was not implemented or framed as an ethnic nor a 
nationalist struggle, why PKK, in a statement published in the time of the15th august 
attack, directly addressed to the leftist turkey, called them to join forces and fight together 
against dictatorship. During the 1980’s and 1990’s PKK tried to establish a partnership 
with other leftist groups by creating cooperated groups. They also continued their armed 
struggle against the Turkish state(ibid: 131). 
The number of young people joining the PKK guerilla grew every day. In just 10 years, the 
PKK had a small military army fighting against the Turkish state. By 1994, the number of 
guerilla fighters were 15.000(Kurdistan.org, 10.12.14). The movement enjoyed a great 
support from regional kurds, but also from several countries including Greece, Cyprus, 
Armenia, Syria, Bulgaria and Russia, and also Germany.   
It was also in the 1990’s the organization made changes in its demands. The leadership 
withdrew the demands for an independent Kurdish state and instead demanded autonomy 
for the Kurds within Turkey (BBC 10.12.14).  
In 1999, the PKK leader, Adullah Öcalan, was arrested Kenya and prisoned in Turkey for 
treason. This meant changes in the organization. Internal conflict and disunity appeared 
within the party. The disagreement was about the new strategy for the organization. 
Though Öcalan is imprisoned for life in Turkey, he is still considered as the leader of the 
organization. Murat Karayilan became the new leader in practice and Doktor Bahoz Erdal 
is now responsible for the movement’s military operations (Kurdistan.org, 10.12.14). 
In prison, Öcalan came across new theories and adopted Murray Bookchin’s theory of 
liberitarian municipalism. Öcalan modified, rarefied and rebranded Bookchin’s vision as 
“democratic confederalism”. This became the new vision of the PKK.  
After the arrest of Apo, the party introduced a five-year ceasefire and tried to change its 
image. They called Ankara to involve the party in the country’s political process, allow 
more cultural rights for the country’s, then estimated, 15 million Kurds and release 
imprisoned PKK members. The Turkish state refused to negotiate with the movement and 
thereby refused to accept the ceasefire, so it ended up being a one-way ceasefire (BBC 
10.12.14).  
 
 
PKK came on the EU terror-list in 2002. In 2008, the European Court of Justice convicted 
the registration of the PKK on the terror-list as invalid, because of lacking ground for why 
the organization can be called a terrorist organization. EU countries have not yet aligned 
with the judgment of the court (Politiken, 10.12.14). 
In 2004, the PKK resumed its violent campaign, which went on until secret peace talks that 
were initiated in 2009. The party declared a new ceasefire. The same year, the Kurdish 
party DTP, the Democratic Society Party, became the 4th biggest party in Turkey after the 
local elections, but later the same year the DTP got banned by Turkey’s constitutional 
court for its alleged links to the PKK. Hundreds of Kurdish activists and many politicians 
were prosecuted under the country’s anti-terror laws (and continue to be prosecuted to this 
day), and many were imprisoned. Many of the activists that were jailed belonged to the 
Kurdistan Communities Union (KCK), a Kurdish umbrella organization which consists of 
both political and armed groups within the Kurdish movement, including the PKK (BBC 
10.12.14). 
Between 2009 and 2011, high-level secret talks took place between the PKK and the 
Turkish government in Oslo, Norway. For this occasion, Öcalan wrote his book “The 
Roadmap to Negotiation” which was his contribution to how to solve the Kurdish issue. 
However, the peace talks collapsed after a clash between Turkish soldiers and the PKK in 
June 2011, in which 14 Turkish soldiers were killed. Both sides blamed each other for the 
clashes and for the discontinuation of the peace talks. 
After the talks were discontinued, the conflict escalated rapidly. The PKK took its 
campaign to a new level by launching major attacks in urban areas of southeastern 
Turkey. Among other things they set up checkpoints on roads.  
In 2012 hundreds of political prisoners went on hunger strike demanding better conditions 
for Öcalan and the right to use the Kurdish language in the justice and education system. 
The hunger strike, which lasted for 68 days, ended after Öcalan urged the prisoners to 
stop, which showed that he remained the most influential actor in the Kurdish movement. 
The hunger strike pushed Recep Tayyip Erdogan, who was the Turkish Prime Minister at 
the time, to take action. On 31 December 2012, Erdogan announced that peace 
negotiations were taking place with Öcalan in Imrali prison, where he is still being held.  
 
 
In March 2013, Öcalan called a ceasefire and urged PKK forces to withdraw from Turkey, 
in an historic announcement at the celebrations of the Kurdish New Year, Newroz. 
Afterwards, the PKK withdrew 3000 of its guerilla fighters from Turkey and the peace talks 
officially began.  
When the civil war in Syria erupted in 2011, the Kurds, who are the largest minority group 
in Syria, chose to join the opposition against Bashar Al Assad, but without directly 
participating in the fighting. The Kurds organized under the Kurdish party PYD (Democratic 
Union Party), sister party of PKK, and took control of big parts of the areas they call 
Western Kurdistan (northeastern Syria) and declared autonomy (Jyllands-Posten, 
10.12.14). PYD created the Kurdish defense force YPG (People’s Defense Units) and 
subsequent YPJ (Women’s Defense Units).  
PYD also chose, in accordance with the PKK’s vision, to implement Öcalan’s ideas of 
democratic confederalism.  
This leads me to the following problemformulation; 
1.2 Problem Formulation: 
With Turkey as a case, is democratic confederalism an alternative to the nation-
state in the Middle East?  
To answer the problem formulation, I see it necessary to ask the following Research 
Questions: 
1.2.1 Reaserch Questions: 
1. What is democratic confederalism? 
2. What is a nation-state? 
3. What is democracy 
4. How did Turkey become a nation-state? 
5. Which structural, political and social changes were made in the new republic 
of Turkey? 
6. Is democratic confederalism an alternativ to nation-state? 
 
 
2. Methodological Chapter 
 
In this chapter, I will present mine the methodological choices to give an introduction to 
which methodological approaches I will take throughout the project. Furthermore, does this 
chapter include mine methodological reflections, where I argue for my choices and the 
limitations in the project. 
2.1 Limitations 
This project aims to discuss whether democratic confederalism is an alternative to nation-
state in the Middle East. This makes the project specific to the Middle East, but I saw it 
necessary to limit the project additionally to Turkey as a case. To make a research with the 
Middle East as a whole would be too broad. However, this project can be generalized to 
other countries in the Middle East, as they started their nation-state building in the same 
period of time as Turkey. The other countries were also build upon the remnants of the 
Ottoman Empire, and have had the same historical “ottoman” background as Turkey. 
While undergoing their nation-state building-process they also experienced many of the 
same difficulties as they did in Turkey.  
I have chosen Turkey as a case study for different reasons. First, Turkey is an allied to the 
West. Ever since the foundation of the republic, the ruling elite have tried to westernize the 
country. Second, Turkey is a candidate for EU membership, a product of the first reason. 
Third, Öcalan, who is the leader of the PKK, developed the idea of democratic 
confederalism. He is also seeing the PKK as product of the Turkish nation-state building. 
The project investigates the last period of the Ottoman Empire until the first period of the 
new-established Republic. The historical period is limited, as I am making a research on 
whether there is an alternative to the global notion of nation-state, why the period of state 
building has my interest.    
The discussion about what democracy really means has always been abstract and 
ambiguous. This is because democracy is not a fixed and finite size, but a more elusive 
concept, which is essentially influenced by subjectivity. I therefor limited the theory of 
democracy to my own understanding of the concept.  
 
 
The empirical data has been selected to maintain the focus on Turkey. 
2.2 Methodological Approach 
 
First, I want to explain the different concepts used in the research. This is a deductive 
approach, as I attempt to understand the meaning of different concepts.  
Next, I found it necessary to combine and implement these theoretical concepts in an 
analysis. This is an inductive approach, since empirical data is required to be tested in its 
validity. As the project have both a deductive and an inductive approach, this project is 
abductive, as the project change between seeking validity and understanding of concepts 
and collected empirical material (Olsen & Pedersen, 2009: 151).  
 
2.3 Epistemology  
Epistemology consists of the issues of what can be considered as acceptable knowledge 
in a discipline. The epistemological position of interpretivism, is concerned with the 
difference between natural sciences and social sciences and emphasizes that it is 
necessary to differentiate between the methods of these disciplines, as the disciplines are 
different (Bryman, 2008:15-16). 
This applies to my project as I am taking an interpretivist approach, which means that I 
want to either explain or understand human behaviour. This is what I intend to do, as I will 
be investigating how the idea of nation-state was understood and implemented in Turkey 
by focusing on the period from the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire up to the foundation 
of the Republic of Turkey. Using this method I will gain a better understanding of how new 
notions actually can change the human's way of thinking and behave. 
2.4 Ontology 
Ontology consists of modes of reality and it focus on explaining the nature of social 
entities. The foundation of the ontological position of constructionism consists of the 
aspect that social phenomena are created by social actors, either as parts of direct or 
indirect actions. In this sense, social phenomena cannot be viewed as independent entities 
as they are constantly being accomplished by social actors (Bryman, 2008: 18-19). 
 
 
I will focus on the western notion of nation-state, nationalism, democracy and secularism, 
as the founders of the Republic of Turkey was inspired by these westerns notions. In this 
sense, constructionism is our ontological standpoint, as the understandings of these 
notions are created and shaped in a certain way. The French and Brits have played a 
active role in describing and defining the understanding of these notion in Turkey, which 
was used as a justification of the nationalistic reforms in Turkey at the time of the 
foundation.  
I also focus on Abdullah Öcalan's idea of democratic confederalism, since the idea is a 
product of the historical development in Turkey. The idea of democratic confederalism is 
Abdullah Öcalan’s contribution to the discussion of what a democratic society must consist 
of. In this sense, constructionism is my ontological standpoint, as the understandings of a 
democratic system and society are created and shaped in a certain way by the social 
actors.  
2.5 Case Study 
 
A case study is a research method and it mainly consists of conducting a defined study of 
a specific case. Case study entails a detailed and intensive analysis of a single case. The 
most common use of the term “case” associates the case study with a location, such as a 
community or organization (Bryman, 2008: 53). 
In this project, I have chosen to investigate Turkey as a single case, where analysis will 
examine the consequences of the foundation of the Republic of Turkey and its nation-state 
building. Using this specific method is beneficial, since case studies have an illustrative 
and descriptive strength, which make this approach favourable in this project. 
The case in this project is an exemplifying case. Exemplifying cases allow the researcher 
to examine key social processes (Bryman, 2008: 56). 
 
2.6 Data Collection 
 
The material used in this research is primary and qualitative material. In order to 
understand what the concept of democratic confederalism is, I saw it necessary to 
understand the PKK and its vision and goals. I attended a weekend camp, organized by 
 
 
the Kurdish youth association in Denmark, where the focus was on the understanding of 
the concepts of democratic confederalism. The introductory speaker was Reimer Heider.  
Reimar Heider is an independent German researcher and human rights activist. Heider 
has translated several of Abdullah Öcalan's books and, in addition to German and English, 
he speak fluent Kurdish and Turkish. In addition, Reimer is active in the International 
Initiative “Freedom for Abdullah Öcalan – Peace in Kurdistan”. 
The weekend camp went on from a Friday to Sunday. 
The first day was about PKK’s history. The second day was about Öcalan’s idea of 
democratic confederalism - how it is implemented in Western Kurdistan - and about 
women’s right in the PKK.  
The last day was reserved to questions, summary and evaluation. 
Beside the weekend camp, I attended a panel debate, in the Danish-Kurdish association in 
Denmark, with a delegation from the Danish party Enhedslisten, who had visited Western 
Kurdistan to see how the idea of democratic confederalism was implemented.  
 
2.7 Analytical Reflections 
 
In order to answer my problem formulation, I am going to analyze which consequences the 
nation-state building of Turkey had for the religious communities and non-Turkish 
minorities within the modern borders of Turkey. First, I will present a contextual chapter 
where I will explain the historical period from the last period of the Ottoman Empire until 
the foundation of the Republic of Turkey, and which notions that were accepted and 
realized under the nation-state building. Within this process, some nationalistic reforms 
were implemented, and these had consequences for the minorities and for the 
democratization process of the new modern state. The analysis will examine these 
consequences. I have chosen to analyze which consequences the reforms had for two 
groups; the Islamic Ummah and the Kurds. These two groups are the largest groups, who 
have been affected by the reforms.  
Second, I will discuss how democratic nation-state and democratic confederalism is. 
Afterwards I will discuss whether the idea of democratic confederalism is an alternative for 
the nation-state. The conclusion of the analysis of the consequences will be used as 
arguments in the discussion.  
 
 
3. Theoretical Chapter 
 
This chapter consists of an overview of the theories and theoretical concepts that will form 
the basis for my analysis and discussion. The theoretical concepts consist of Nation-state, 
democracy and democratic confederalism. 
This theory section consists of a nation-state theory section, where I briefly explain the 
concept of nation-state and the reason for the creation of it. Under the Enlightenment, the 
people seek towards a democracy, why I after the nation-state section will present 
commonsense democracy, where I begin by presenting Robert A. Dahl's criteria for a 
democratic process. Next, I seek to track more into western forms of democracy, by 
starting in Dahl's thoughts about polyarchy as a concept.  
The last section of the theory chapter will contain Abdullah Öcalans ideas of democratic 
confederalism.  
3.1 The Nation-state 
The nation-state is a form of political organization, and a political ideal. In the first case, it 
is an autonomous political community bound together by the overlapping bonds of 
citizenship and nationality. In the latter case, the nation-state is a principle, or ideal type, 
reflected in Mazzini’s goal: “every nation a state, only one state for the entire 
nation”(Mazzini in Heywood, 2007; 123). As such, the nation-state principle embodies the 
belief that nations are “natural” political communities, whose strength derives from 
overlapping civic and cultural bonds.  
Some theorists believe that the nation-state has its roots far back in history, while others 
believe that the nation-state is a new and modern phenomenon.  
As mentioned, there exists several different paradigms within nation theories, each with its 
view of the nation state’s history and character, and the following sections will deal with 
one of these paradigms. Modernity paradigm, which is said to be the leading paradigm 
within nation theory (Smith, 2000: 72). 
Within modernity paradigm are the concepts of “nationalism” and the “nation-state” modern 
phenomena. It is nationalism, along with the modern state that has "created" nation-state. 
 
 
Modernity theorists believe, therefore, that the nation-state does not have a deep historical 
anchoring, but have occurred in the late 1700s (Smith, 2000: 72ff). 
Benedict Anderson, an English anthropologist, illustrate in her theory how the former 
religious system, and thereby the sacred language, Latin, gradually disappeared after the 
late Middle Ages. Instead, one "discovered" and reintroduced to the native tongues, which 
was exploited by capitalist publishers. The publishers began publishing books on native 
language, to create a profit on the huge market, which the masses represented. Thereby 
became, for example, French-speaking worker, aware of the millions of other French-
speaking people and felt connected with them, even though he did not know them 
personally. This formed in several ways the basis for a kind of imagined national 
community among people with common native language (Anderson, 2001: 62ff). Anderson 
also describes that, at the same time, there was a degradation of the dynastic kingdoms 
power. Previously these enjoyed a legitimacy that originated in a general view of the 
regime or ruler, as above ordinary people. However, with secularism the dynasties 
previous basis of legitimacy disappeared, and instead they had to, according to Anderson, 
trying to inflict upon a national character (Anderson, 2001: 83ff). At the same time, the 
revolutionary mindset arised among the population and a political mobilization of the 
masses happened, partly based on the ideals of the thinkers of the Enlightenment. These 
ideals puts the human/individual in the center, rejects the traditional metaphysical and 
religious world, and argues for bourgeois democracy foundation, and the recognition of 
basic human rights. It was because of this political mobilization that dynasties saw it 
necessary to create nationalism (and therefore a national community), as a form of social 
control. The state, which had lost its previous legitimacy, had to create the idea of the 
nation state as a way to achieve loyalty among the people. Only by giving people influence 
towards the state, the state could maintain control over the people - and this resulted in the 
construction of the nation-state (Andersen & Kaspersen 2007: 545f). 
 
3.2 Democracy 
The concept of democracy is presented, as it will be used as a measurement instrument in 
the discussion, where I will measure how democratic systems nation-states and 
democratic confederalism is.  
 
 
This section will first present commonsense democracy, where I begin by presenting 
Robert A. Dahl's criteria for a democratic process. Next, I seek to track more into western 
forms of democracy, by starting in Dahl's thoughts about polyarchy as a concept.  
3.2.1 Robert A. Dahl - The democratic process 
Robert Dahl has outlined a number of criteria on the best way of how and on what terms a 
society can achieve the democratic ideal. These criteria shall be the means for society to 
achieve its goal: the ideal democracy, but it does not mean that it necessarily achieved. 
Robert A. Dahl stresses that there are two ways of understanding the concept of 
democracy. The first is an ideal, and the second is reality. These two ways of 
understanding democracy, can affect the way people address and considers democracy. 
Therefore, it is important to distinguish between what constitutes an ideal democracy, and 
an actual concrete democracy.  
3.2.2 Criteria for a democratic process 
Dahl identifies five criteria for how a democracy should be designed to actually be 
democratic. These criteria are an image of the ideal democracy, since no society will ever 
be able to meet all the criteria, according to Dahl. (Dahl 2000, p. 37 f.) This is because 
there are many limitations that reality imposes a community, and this is one of the 
differences between the ideal and reality. The criteria are still some essential functions 
according to Dahl. First, they act as standards or guidelines for the political system and 
their institutions. Additionally, they can be used to assess how democratic a system, 
institution, etc. is, and can therefore shed light on the shortcomings that might exist in the 
political reality. (Dahl 2000, p. 37 f.) Dahl presents therefore five criteria for how the ideal 
democratic system can be as democratic as possible if the five criteria are followed as 
standards in the political system. Dahl takes in its examples of criteria based on an 
association, but these criteria are set as overall criteria for any democratic institution. 
Criteria for a democratic process: 
1. Participation/Co-determination 
The aim with this criterion is to prevent the possibility of a small group of members of 
the association to dominate the discussion, and possibly exclude and limit the 
discussion to only a few members. Therefore, the criterion prevents a small group 
 
 
dominance in the ruling of the association. (Dahl 2000, p. 34 f.). This criterion is closely 
linked to one of the basic democratic principles, freedom of expression. All members of 
society should have the opportunity to express their views on specific policies, and 
thereby influence the legislative process. In a democracy, it is beneficial that the 
citizens can express their views, since the decisions often will affect the population as a 
whole. By giving citizens equal opportunities for expression, avoids that some 
individuals dominate the agenda. Additionally, it promotes participation in democracy 
as freedom of speech means that the citizen has the opportunity to engage in political 
debate, can question the policy, and propose solutions to problems, and so on. 
2. Equality in election 
The second criterion is to ensure that all votes in the association will be counted on the 
basis of equal rights. The criterion will therefore prevent the votes are not weighted 
differently and thereby prioritize some members more than others, and thereby provide 
a bias in the political equality. (Dahl 2000, p. 34 f.) Whatever the topic it covers, and 
under what circumstances the vote takes place, the citizens' votes count for equally. 
The population must be seen as a whole, and must therefore have a total vote, which 
for example may be expressed through referendums. If the votes are weighted 
differently, then referendums cannot be a representative picture of the public's concern. 
Furthermore, with the equality in elections the society makes sure that it’s ultimately the 
people who has the sovereignty, and that power comes from the people.  
 
3. Access to information  
The third criterion is to ensure that all members of the association must be informed of 
the relevant policy and its consequences. (Dahl 2000, p. 34 f.) 
In a democracy, it is essential that the citizen should have access to information about 
policy and the changes to a given policy may result. Therefore, there is a focus on 
informing the citizens as logically; one takes the best decisions if one have the right 
information and conditions. This implies a certain degree of knowledge that all citizens 
have equal access to. (Dahl 2000, p. 35 f.) Thus, the debate about a given policy will 
be more rational if the citizen is as informed as possible. For the citizen can be 
 
 
informed, it is necessary that the citizen has the right to seek information and get a 
subject illuminated from several different angles. A democratic society is thus obliged 
to provide opportunities for information searching available, for example, through 
access to the Internet, libraries, etc. Additionally, not make assault on the very same 
information, for example through censorship. 
4. Control of the agenda 
This fourth criterion will ensure that members have the same opportunity to decide 
which cases they will have on the agenda. Therefore, this criterion also ensures that, 
the democratic process will not be closed before the previous three criteria are met. 
(Dahl 2000, p. 34 f.) 
In a democratic society, all citizens shall have an influence on the political agenda, that 
is, according to Dahl, to bring a particular topic up to political discussion. This point will 
lead to the political agenda will open, where everyone has the opportunity to contribute, 
unlike a closed agenda, where only certain people or bodies which have the ability to 
put things on the agenda. That way you get a more open political process. The media 
play also an important role, often acts as a sort of link between people and politicians 
Control of the agenda entails that citizens have the opportunity to become even more 
involved in politics, and express their wishes and needs. This point is connected 
somehow with the previous point "Obtaining insight", since they both lead to a form of 
information requirements. 
 
5. No exclusion of adults 
The fifth criterion is to be understood that all adults in the association must have the 
civil rights concluded in the previous four criteria. In addition, this prevent discrimination 
based on gender, age and race. All members of the association should be seen as 
members with equal rights. (Dahl 2000, p. 34 f.) All who are influenced by society's 
decisions must have the possibility of influence on them. For that reason, Dahl includes 
all citizens of the community in this ideal, i.e. also children, and seriously mentally 
challenged. He points out, however, that if this is not possible, then it should be a 
minimum requirement that all adult residents have full civil rights, that is all the criteria 
 
 
mentioned (Dahl 2000, p. 34 f.) It should not be possible for example to deprive 
mentally unstable persons and nationals residing abroad, their civil rights. 
This criterion is relatively wide. The ideal situation would be that all citizens, without 
exception, should have full civil rights. 
However, it is not the situation in many modern democracies. In many places there is an 
age restriction on voting rights and thus influence on policy. At the same time one can 
deprive mentally challenged their right to vote, so they thereby become incapacitated. This 
can have the consequence that even though the country's laws and regulations applicable 
to them, and they are affected by the political decisions that are adopted, they have no 
chance to get access to the political system and influence it, on an equal footing with other 
citizens. It is, according to Dahl, criticizabel for a democratic society. As previously 
mentioned, Robert Dahl see these criteria as an ideal of democracy. Thus, there is no 
state that has lived up to them, and he assumes that there is not going to be so in the 
future. The criteria are also a form of civil rights that must be assigned to all members of 
society. Factors such as sex, color, age should not be able to restrict these rights. "To the 
extent that any of these requirements are violated, members are not political equals." 
(Dahl, 2000, p. 34f). 
In the Western world there is often a broad consensus that democracy is the best form of 
government. In order to describe these democracies adequate, it is necessary to first 
describe the elements that Western democracies have in common. It is also important to 
stress that since no democratic society meets Dahl's criteria, the term "polyarchy" more 
appropriate. Therefore, I will now review the concept of polyarchy: 
3.2.3 The Polyarchy 
"Polyarchy" is a term developed to describe the political processes and institutions of 
modern representative democracy (Heywood 2007; 33). The concept polyarchy was first 
used by Robert A. Dahl in 1953, and although the development of polyarchy is closely 
related to ideas of liberalism, the term is often used instead of liberal democracy. 
(Heywood 2007; 33). The replacement of the concepts used to describe Western society is 
beneficial, since the phenomenon of "liberal democracy" gives rise to a greater degree of 
idealism, and therefore more significant ideas about the normative objectives associated 
with this (Heywood 2007; 33). The notion of polyarchy is therefore a more realistic 
 
 
formulation of the characteristics of the political processes in modern representative 
democracy, as the shortcomings of society will be recognized. Polyarchy is therefore a 
more appropriate term for Western societies, as these societies are not able to live up to 
all the ideals associated with democracy, and this is incorporated in the formulation of 
polyarchy. (Heywood 2007; 33). The polyarchy’s connection to liberalism is obvious in 
several contexts. The Western polyarchy has roots in the classical liberal values based on 
respect for individual rights. (Heywood 2007; 33). The individual must be protected from 
abuse by the state, which should have minimal impact on the citizen's freedom of choice. 
The most central aspects of polyarchy is according to Robert A. Dahl (Dahl, 1989: 211): 
• The right to rule stays with the elected representatives. 
• The electoral process is fair and inclusive. 
• Nearly all adult citizens have the right to vote 
• The right to run for election is not restricted 
• Freedom of expression, including the right of criticism and demonstration 
• Citizens have free access to information 
• groups and associations have some independence from government interference. 
3.4 Democratic Confederalism 
After his arrest and under his first period in prison Abdullah Öcalan came across new 
theories and adopted Murray Bookchin’s theory of liberitarian municipalism. Öcalan 
modified, rarefied and rebranded Bookchin’s vision as “democratic confederalism”. This 
became the new vision of the PKK.  
Acoording to Öcalan it is important to theoretically distinguish a nation-state and a 
democratic nation. A nation-state requires the homogeneity of citizens with a single 
language and single ethnicity. It binds citizens to this belief it not patriotism; rather it is 
chauvinistic nationalism. The nation-state disapproves of social differences, insisting on 
their sameness, as fascist ideology did. (Öcalan, 2012: 22). 
By contrast, a democratic nation is multilingual, multi-religious, multi-ethnic and multi-
cultural, encompassing groups and individuals with different interests. It does not base 
itself on the sameness of citizens and groups. It rejects the question between state and 
nation, viewing each as different formation. A democratic nation considers groups, 
 
 
religious communities and civil society to be as important as the citizens, and 
constitutionally secures their existence (Öcalan, 2012: 22).  
Democratic confederalism can be categorized as a non-state administration or a 
democracy without a state. Democratic decision-making processes must not be confused 
with the processes known from public administration. States only administrate while 
democracies govern. States are founded on power; democracies are based on collective 
consensus.  
Democratic confederalism is open towards other political groups and fractions. It is flexible, 
multicultural, anti-monopolistic, and consensus-oriented. Ecology and feminism are central 
pillars. In the frame of this kind of self-administration an alternative economy will become 
necessary, which increases the resources of the society instead of exploiting them and 
thus does justice to the multiple needs of the society (Öcalan 2011: 21). In contrast to a 
centralist and bureaucratic understanding of administration and exercise of power, 
confederalism poses a type of political self-administration where all groups of the society 
and all cultural identities can express themselves in local meetings, general conventions 
and councils. This understanding of democracy opens the political space to all strata of the 
society and allows for the formation of different and diverse political groups. In this way it 
also advances the political integration of the society as a whole (Öcalan, 2011: 26). 
According to Öcalan, terms like federalism or self-administration, as they can be found in 
liberal democracies, needs to be conceived anew. Essentially, they should not be 
conceived as hierarchical levels of the administration of the nation-state, but rather as 
central tools of social expression and participation.  
The creation of an operational level where all kinds of social and political groups, religious 
communities, or intellectual tendencies can express themselves directly in all local 
decision-making processes can also be called participative democracy. The stronger the 
participation the more powerful is this kind of democracy (Öcalan, 2011: 26).  
The social actors, which are each for itself federative units, are the germ cells of 
participative democracy. They can combine and associate into new groups and 
confederations according to the situation. Each of the political units involved in 
participative democracy is essentially democratic. In this way, what we call democracy 
then is the application of democratic processes of decision-making from the local level to 
 
 
the global level in the framework of a continuous political process. This process will affect 
the structure of the social web of the society in contrast to the striving for homogeneity of 
the nation-state, a construct that can only be realized by force thus bringing about the loss 
of freedom. 
In democratic confederalism the local level is the level where the decisions are made. 
However, the thinking leading to these decisions needs to be in line with global issues. It is 
necessary to become aware of the fact that even villages and urban neighborhoods 
require confederate structures. All areas of the society need to be given to self-
determination, all levels of it need to be free to participate (Öcalan, 2011: 27).  
Öcalan lists five principles of democratic confederalism; 
1. The right of self-determination of the peoples. This includes the peoples right to a 
state of their own. However, the foundation of a state does not increase freedom of 
a people. The system of the United Nations that is based on nation-states has 
remained inefficient. Meanwhile, nation-states have become serious obstacles for 
any social development. Democratic confederalism is the contrasting paradigm of 
the oppressed people. 
 
2. Democratic confederalism is a non-state paradigm. It is not controlled by a state. At 
the same time, democratic confederalism is the cultural organizational blueprint of a 
democratic nation. 
 
3. Democratic confederalism is based on grass-roots participation. Its decision-making 
processes lie with the communities. Higher levels only serve the coordination and 
implementation of the will of the communities that send their delegates to the 
general assemblies. For limited space of time they are both mouthpiece and 
executive institutions. However, the basic power of decision rests with the local 
grass-roots institutions. 
 
4. In the Middle East, democracy cannot be imposed by the capitalist system and its 
imperial powers, which only damage democracy. The propagation of grass-roots 
democracy is elementary. It is the only approach that can handle with the diverse 
 
 
ethnical groups, religions and class differences. It also goes together with the 
traditional confederate structure of the society. 
 
5. Democratic confederalism in Kurdistan is an anti-nationalist movement as well. It 
aims at realizing the right of self-defence of the people by the advancement of 
democracy in all parts of Kurdistan without questioning the existing political borders. 
Its goal is not the foundation of a Kurdish nation-state. The movement intends to 
establish federal structures in Iran, Syria, Turkey and Iraq that are open for all 
Kurds and at the same time form an umbrella confederation for all four parts of 
Kurdistan (Öcalan, 2011: 33ff). 
 
As a concrete suggestion to solve the Kurdish issue in Turkey, Abdullah Öcalan has 
formulated the concept of Democratic Republic. 
3.4.1 Democratic Republic 
A republic is a type of state. But seeing the republic as a nation-state – especially strict 
nation-state forms – leads to the separation of peoples. The ideal state for a republic is not 
a nation-state, but a democratic state. A state cannot at once, be a nation-state and a 
democratic state, they are mutually contradictory. A democratic state is receptive to a 
democratic system and can be reconciled with it. A nation-state has no such aims; on the 
contrary, it assimilates democratic society. The important thing is to envisage and 
construct the republic as the umbrella organization for democratization, for all citizens. 
When developing democratic solution, the republic should not be ideological or tied to a 
single ethnicity or religion. It is critical to define the republic as the organization of 
democratic laws for all citizens. Social and secularist principles would be embodied 
concisely within the definition of the republic. By clearly defining the republic, we can avoid 
tying it to a single ethnicity, religion or ideology.  
The republic would be more complete and united if concepts such as Turkishness or 
Kurdishness (which embody ethnicity and race) as well as religious and ideological terms 
such as Islam, Christianity, Liberalism are not included in the definition (Öcalan, 2012: 
28f).   
 
 
 
4. Contextual Chapter 
The aim of this chapter is to give an overview of Turkey’s historical change from the last 
period of the Ottoman Empire to the foundation of the Republic of Turkey. 
During the nineteenth century, the Ottoman Empire witnessed a sustained effort of reform 
that saw the long preserved and honored institutions of the classical Ottoman state 
replaced by new ones, inspired by an increasing knowledge of European thought, society, 
and government and modified to satisfy Ottoman needs and conditions. In the process the 
scope of government was extended far beyond the limits imposed by the traditional 
Ottoman way into everyday aspect of life, overwhelming the autonomous religious, 
economic and social groups that had survived for so long as the substrata of Ottoman 
society. A new, modern, westernized ruling bureaucracy replaced the old ruling class, 
extended its power throughout the empire, and created a highly complex system of 
government that ruled with an autocracy unmatched in traditional times (J. Shaw & Kural 
Shaw, 1977: 3).  
The era of modern Ottoman reforms began in the last decade of the reign of Sultan 
Mahmut II (1808-1839), who laid the foundations for what followed. His work was extended 
and at least partially completed during the Tanzimat reform period, which encompassed 
the reigns of his sons Abdulmecit I (1839-1861) and Abdulaziz (1861-1876), and it was 
carried out by the reformist bureaucracy of the Men of the Tanzimat, led by able statesmen 
(J.Shaw & Kural Shaw, 1977: 3). 
Reform in the Ottoman Empire was a complex process; each solution created new 
problems. The application of new laws and practices was solved for a number of reasons. 
First of all, the empire remained very large, with a heterogeneous society and relatively 
poor communications. Second, the inexperience of the reformers and the greed of the 
imperial powers of Europe for profits at the expense of the relatively undeveloped empire 
and its peoples perpetuated and deepened a series of economic problems inherited from 
the past. Third, demands for social and political reforms, themselves consequences of the 
Tanzimat, conflicted with the desire of its leaders to modernize as rapidly and efficiently as 
possible without the delays and compromises inherent in any democratic system. Fourth, 
nationalistic elements among the minorities, nourished and sustained by Russia and, to a 
lesser extent, the other Western power, demanded autonomy or independence from the 
 
 
empire and dramatized their ambitions with sporadic terrorism within the Ottoman 
dominions and with anti-Muslim propaganda in Europe and America. Finally, great power, 
though held back from breaking up and partitioning the empire by their concern to 
preserve the European balance of power, intervened in internal Ottoman affairs to secure 
political and economic advantages for themselves. While the Ottoman reformers adjusted 
themselves and their programs as much as possible to meet these and other challenges, 
they lacked the knowledge, experience and strength need to solve them within the 
relatively short time left by their enemies. 
Though the Tanzimat reforms were accompanied by an extension of the principle of 
representative government, ironically the culminated in the sovereign autocracy of 
Abdulhamit II (1876-1909), who brought them to full realization. After a brief period of 
democracy following his deposition, there was a return to autocracy led by the leaders of 
the Young Turks regime (1908-1918), who continued the reforms in many areas while 
dragging and unprepared empire into the World War I, where devastation and defeat led to 
its ultimate dissolution (J.Shaw & Kural Shaw, 1977: 4). 
After having ruled over an empire that stretched across three continents and included the 
Middle Eastern, North African, Central Asiatic and a large number of Eastern European 
nations since the mid-1400s, the throne under the autocratic Ottoman Turkish sultan in 
Istanbul started to creak. For centuries, he had ruled this enormous territory under Islam's 
green flag, but with a loose administrative system, that gave the individual nations and 
regions a kind of autonomy and rights to manage their own lives, practice their own 
religion and speak their own language, as long as they recognized the sultan's supremacy 
and Islam as the official state religion. However, in the 1800s new movements from 
Western Europe of nations thinking and ethnic based identity began pulling eastward. The 
Ottoman and predominantly Turkish elite, in both the civil and military bureaucracy that 
especially had extensive contact with Germany and France, was impressed by the 
economic growth, which roared forward with western industrialization, and they were 
inspired by the effectiveness of European government institutions and the high degree of 
political centralization, which gave wide authority to those in power to determine the 
course for the state (Rojan, 2010: 20f). In comparison with the Western powers, which in 
the 1680s had put an end to the Ottoman military advance into Central Europe, the 
Ottomans' own multicultural and administratively fragmented state form, which in 
 
 
European capitals had been nicknamed "Sick Man of Europe", had paled. The days of 
multi-ethnic, religious and dynastic empires was over, and something must be done 
drastically, concluded a group of Turkish soldiers. The pursuit of the Turkish identity and 
the notion of Turkish racial superiority began as a reaction against the aging Ottoman 
system. The so-called Young Turks, a secular and Western-oriented political movement of 
highly educated elite officers in the Ottoman military machine would, by all means, break 
free of the backward and diseased empire frameworks and build a new order based on 
Turkish national purity and in a state model resembled Western European countries. The 
theoretical thought of the nation concepts, ethnically based nation-states and race thinking 
was obtained from Germany, France and Italy. The Turkish people had to be rescued from 
going down with the Ottoman ship, the Young Turks believed, and they even succeeded in 
their endeavor. Under the movement's official name Unity & Progress (Ittihar ve Terraki) 
they committed a coup d'etat against the Ottoman Sultan Abdul-Hamid II in 1908 (Rojan, 
2010: 21). 
The Young Turks who came to power through the constitutional movement in 1908 
retained the dynasty and tried to manipulate its legacy in order to carry out a program of 
radical reform and structural change. But later, the regime led by Mustafa Kemal, which 
succeeded the Young Turks, tried totally to reject the entire legacy, abolished the 
monarchy, banished the dynasty, and set up a secular republic. Even this rejection was 
premised on the charisma of the Ottoman dynasty which, had it been permitted any role, 
however formal, would have threatened the entire enterprise of creating a new Turkey. By 
the end of World War I, the Ottoman imperial territory contracted to the space of the 
Anatolian peninsula, some regions of which were occupied by the Allied forces. Some 
officers of the Ottoman army and remnants of the Committee of Union and Progress, 
which had ruled the Empire between 1913 and 1918, organized an armed resistance 
against the occupation of Anatolia. In 1919 the Liberation war began. Some leaders in the 
nationalist movement recognized the power inherent in the traditional symbols and wanted 
to retain them so far as to facilitate the legitimization of the new government. One of them, 
Rauf Orbay, declared in July 1922, as victory was in sight, 
“It is hard for us to control the general situation. This can only be secured by an authority 
that everyone is accustomed to regard as unapproachably high. Such is the office of 
 
 
Sultanate and Caliphate. To abolish this office and try to set up an entity of a different 
character in its place, would lead to failure and disaster” (Ahmed, 1993: 15). 
By 1922, the Ankara government was established and ended up the occupation of 
Anatolia and recaptured some international recognition as an autonomous power over 
what remained of the Ottoman Empire. Having achieved power and legitimacy, the Ankara 
government declared the foundation of the Republic of Turkey in 1923, leaving its diffecult 
past behind and reforging its political identity based on national model. 
The Young Turks had laid the foundation stone for the Republic of Turkey, which after 
small fifteen years and a war against Western countries saw the light in the ruins of the 
First World War's destruction of the Ottoman Empire. Now there was no longer an abstract 
and transnational tie based on Islamic brotherhood that tied the inhabitants together. 
Instead, the Turkish national identity was prioritized, and all people within the country was 
regarded as Turks. Within a few years, General Mustafa Kemal, the new republic's 
founder, abolished the Arabic alphabet and introduced the Latin, replaced all Kurdish, 
Armenian and Greek place names with Turkish, introduced a strict requirement for Turkish 
surnames and a ban on traditional robes and headgear Rojan, 2010: 21f). The secular 
ideology ”Kemalism”, named after Mustafa Kemal, who later got the nickname Atatürk, 
which means Father of the Turks, superseded Islam. The aim for Mustafa Kemal was a 
complete change of the Turkish society, where there should be the greatest possible 
distance to the multicultural past that were considered outdated and contrary to Western 
traditions. Instead, Mustafa Kemal ought to formulate a new Turkish identity based on 
ethnocentric community. The idea to construct a national identity is neither Turkish or 
particularly odious. All modern nation states underlie a similar construction process. The 
aim here is to create, particularly through education, the perception of a nation united by 
language, cultural symbols and common past that can both define us, but just as much to 
define the others. Following the new national reconstruction project, the Turks were urged 
to organize under the nationalist banner. In the decades after the founding of the Republic 
lots of cultural societies and sport clubs, academic study groups, professional 
organizations and newspapers of nationalist character and content was established. 
The same trend appeared in the first half of the 20th century in many European, Middle 
Eastern and African countries, and the political cult of national identity gave many places 
this growing nationalism a very radical expression. The most famous of the results of the 
 
 
nationalist wave on the European continent is Mussolini's Italy, Franco's Spain and Hitler's 
Germany. The fascist race thinking that had proved to be politically successful infected 
many contemporary countries. Among Turkish ultranationalists, the euro Aryan race 
superiority was replaced by the notion of the Turkish race natural superiority. The vision 
was to create a strong state with one language, one flag and one nation. This was realized 
with the first constitution in 1924.   
 
5. Analytical Chapter 
The aim of this chapter is to analyze which consequences the nation-state building had for 
the peoples and groups within the new modern borders of Turkey that were not ethnic 
Turks or did not have the same ideological and political persuasion. In this analysis, I will 
focus on the Islamic Ummah (Brotherhood/society) and the Kurds in Turkey, as they 
fought the liberation war side by side with the nationalists Turks, but had other aims then 
the building of a nation-state. 
 
5.1 Islam and the modern Republic of Turkey 
The foundation of the new nation-state Turkey also introduced secularism in Turkey. While 
the Ottoman sultans administered the state using distinct traditions and had morals and 
rules, albeit of religious character, the new republic was in contradiction to that.   
Secularization and the disappearance of religious symbols and practice from public places 
such as the removal of crosses from schools and courts, is a significant aspect of French 
secularism, which took place gradually during the Third Republic (1871-1940). In Turkey, 
as in other Muslim countries, secularism is considered to be the requirement for 
Westernization rather than of democratization (Göle, 1997: 49). Secularism, as a 
modernist ideology in Turkey, is linked to the state’s control of the public sphere. Turkish 
secularism has meant banning of religious orders, dress codes for public servant and the 
imposition of certain of audio-visual programming at state radio stations and television 
channels. The Turkish model of secularism introduced radical institutional changes at the 
executive and legislative levels, such as the abolition of the Sultanate and the Caliphate in 
1924; the abolition of religious courts and religious titles; the adoption of a secular civil 
 
 
code of law from Switzerland in 1926; and the declaration that the Turkish republic was a 
“secular state” by a constitutional amendment in 1937 (ibid). Alongside these changes, 
secularism became instrumental in creating new republican elites. This took place 
primarily by means of the national education system. The state delegitimized religious 
education and established the supremacy of the secular modern education nation-wide.the 
building of the nation-state was thus accompanied by the centralization of education and 
the formation of its nationalist elites. The reformation of the education system meant the 
replacement of the Arabic script by the Latin script (ibid). This actually meant that a big 
group of the Islamic Ummah became illiterate. The purification of the Turkish language 
from Persian and Arabic influences, and the recreation of the öztürkce (pure Turkish) 
language secured by the establishment of the Turkish Linguistic Society created a radical 
break with the Ottoman past. The Turkish language became obligatory in national 
education, and the use of foreign languages, other that Western ones, was forbidden 
(Göle, 1997: 50). The change of script from Arabic to Latin also contributed to the 
consolidation of secularism as well. It accomplished this by cutting the ties of the Islamic 
Ummah to the language and script of the Quran, and to the Arabic and Muslim world in 
general. In their endeavor the “demystify” religion, the republican elites encouraged the 
translation of the Quran to Turkish, and mandated that the call for prayer from the 
mosques be in Turkish rather than Arabic. Thus, language and script reforms introduced a 
radical cultural shift towards the Western world both symbolically and literally. These 
changes also resulted in the shift of the elites. The intellectual Muslims were no longer a 
part of the elite. Instead, new elites were born owing their existence and power to the 
Republic. As their justification for existence was closely linked to the nation-state, they 
became the natural advocators of the Kemalist ideology. These new republican elites 
identified themselves as ilerici Atatürkcü aydinlar (progressive Kemalist intellectuals), thus 
denoting their allegiance as intellectuals to Atatük’s reforms. These new elites were faithful 
to the interest of the nation-state and were dedicated to the values of secularism and 
progress (ibid).  
All these changes were of great importance for the Islamic Ummah’s relationships to the 
nation-state. A large proportion of the Islamic Ummah became illiterate with the shift to 
Latin script and got great limitations of their educational opportunities. Muslims who 
practiced their religion, especially girls, were limited by clothing prohibitions. To wear 
 
 
headgear in public institutions were forbidden. This resulted in an uneducated group. The 
Islamic Ummah lost their power in decision-making and therefore could not represent their 
interests. 
The Islamic Ummah in Turkey fought, in the Liberation war (1919-1922) side by side with 
the young Turks, because they thought that there was going to be established a state with 
the restoration of the Sharia, the religious law of the Muslims. Instead the constitution of 
the Republic of Turkey replaced it (Ahmed 1993: 36).  
In 1923, Said-i-Nursi and Mehmet Akif Ersoy, two very important figures of the Islamic 
movement, were sent to exile because of their work for reconstruction of an Islamic State. 
 
5.2 The Kurdish issue in Turkey 
Probably no other issue has plagued the Turkish state as continual as the Kurdish issue. 
The Turkish Republic has, since its foundation in the early 1920s fought with the Kurdish 
issue, which has assumed many forms since then, including armed resistance, massive 
political discontent, lack of cultural integration and serious poverty.  
In 1922, the Grand National Assembly of Turkey accepted the establishment of an 
assembly based on autonomy for Kurds, in a secret vote of 373 to 63 (Öcalan, 2012: 47). 
Having achieved power and legitimacy, the Ankara government declared the foundation of 
the republic in 1923, reforging it political identity based on a national model. It was within 
this context that the Turkish state abandoned first its earlier politics of recognition, then, 
second, its acknowledgment of the ethnic aspect of the Kurdish issue. Even though the 
state still acknowledged that its citizenry was composed not only of ethnic Turks at the 
time the first republican constitution was enacted in 1924, it nevertheless asserted that, 
with the exception of the religious minorities protected by the Treaty of Lausanne, no other 
ethnic groups would enjoy cultural rights (Yegen in Casier & Jongerden, 2011: 69). All-non 
Turkish citizens of the republic other than Greeks, Armenians and Jews now had to 
become Turkish. The politics of recognition was over. The Kurds fought in the Liberation 
war with the expectations of an autonomy, but instead they were met by politics of 
oppression and assimilation. For the founders of the republic, the Kurdish issue was no 
longer a political issue requiring recognition. During the first decades following the 
foundation of the republic, its founders reframed the Kurdish issue as a clash between the 
past and present. The Kurds began their resistance against the republic in 1925, and the 
 
 
same year the leaders of the rebellion was sentenced to death. The revised conceptual 
framework and its effects can be found in the speech of the chairman of the Court of 
Independence, which sentenced the leaders; 
“Some of you used people for your personal interests, and some of you followed foreign 
incitement and political ambitions, but all of you marched to a certain point: the 
establishment of an independent Kurdistan. […] Your political reaction and rebellion were 
destroyed immediately by the decisive acts of the government of the Republic and by the 
fatal strokes of Republican Army. […] Everybody must know that as the young Republican 
government will definitely not condone any cursed action like incitement and political re-
action, it will prevent this sort of banditry by means of its precise precautions. The poor 
people of this region who have been exploited and oppressed under the domination of 
sheikhs and feudal landlords will be freed from your incitements and evil, and they will 
follow the efficient paths of our Republic which promises progress and prosperity (Yegen 
in Casier & Jongerden, 2011: 69). 
This long text demonstrates that for the Turkish state at this time, The Kurdish issue was 
an issue of the resistance of the past against the present. In other words, the new regime 
believed that the Kurds, who in their view represented backward social forces, were 
rebelling against the modern state power that promised progress and prosperity. To this 
logic, what the Kurdish rebels resisted was not the establishment of a nation-state over 
what remained from a multi-ethnic empire, but the present, which was embodied in the 
republican government and the republican army.  
By 1930s, the characterization of the issue as one of “resistance of the past” was revised. 
It was alleged that there were no Kurds in Turkey, and thus the issue at stake, that is, the 
incidences of Kurdish unrest, had no ethno-political component. The Turkish state began 
to manage the resistance as a purely social issue, wherein the modern state was obligated 
to subdue the obstructive influence of sheikhs, landlords and tribes (ibid:70). During the 
1930s, the state made an attempt to “solve” the Kurdish issue by means of massive 
enforced resettlements. The official explanation for the legislation mandating the 
resettlement was the Turkification (assimilation) of non-Turks. The Turkification process 
meant the injunction of the Kurdish language. Every publication in Kurdish and about 
Kurds and their history was prohibited. Kurdish literature was destroyed and banned. In 
addition, in the educational system children was indoctrinated with Turkish nationalism. 
 
 
Girls were taken away from their families and replaced in Turkish foster families, mostly 
families with an attachment to the elite and military. The existence of Kurds were denied 
and instead they were called Mountain Bedouins and Mountain Turks. The word Kurd 
came, according to the republican elite, from the sounds the shoes made when stepping 
on the snow on the mountains (the sounds are kart & kurt). Until the 1990s, this perception 
was still a reality in Turkey (ibid: 71).  
 
5.3 Part Conclusion 
 
The consequences of the nation-state building for the peoples and groups within the new 
modern borders of Turkey that were not ethnic Turks or did not have the same ideological 
and political persuasion was very severe. On the road to becoming a Western-like nation-
state with democracy, the republic turned into a dictatorship.  
Democracy has been discussed in Turkey since the Tanzimat period, yet it remained 
undeveloped both theoretically and institutionally. Least of all did it ever really meant 
anything for the people? It was a game played mainly by the new republican elite. Law 
consisted simply of the rules of the state: individual and human rights were never given a 
chance. The system permitted freedom, neither of speech nor of association. Freedom of 
expression and association that did not rest on a certain social consensus was frequently 
eliminated. These freedoms and principal features of democratization were not permitted 
for the oppressed religious communities and peoples. The two greatest undemocratic 
decisions that were taken by the Republican elite was: 
 1) To establish a state based on nationalism. The nationalist reforms took away the non-
Turkish minorities their basic rights. The official ideology denied the existence of the 
Kurdish people, who were to be eliminated through physical punishment and through 
profound and comprehensive assimilationist programs. 
2) the deterioration of the alliance with the Islamic Ummah. There was a constant 
ideological campaign against the Ummah and its supporters in the name of secularism – 
the issue was presented as progressive. But in truth, this was the system’s hegemonic 
choice. Putting the Ummah and its supporters (the dominant section of the society) under 
its hegemony was a conscious antidemocratic move.  
 
 
Both the Islamic Ummah and the Kurds fought with the young Turks in the Liberation war 
for different reasons and interests. However, the non-Muslim and the non-Turkish 
communities were apprehensive that the new regime would be used as a means to revive 
and strengthen the empire under the leadership of the largest group, the Turks. That would 
threaten the privileges of the religious communities organized under the traditional 
Ottoman system, which guaranteed virtual autonomy in cultural and educational affairs. 
The non-Turkish people feared centralization and Turkification. Though they were the 
greatest allies, the new republic elite worked against them after the foundation of the 
republic. The question is; would these two groups had helped the young Turks if they knew 
what the outcome would be? 
Mustafa Kemal said that he kept the idea of a republic secret until the appropriate day 
came to declare it (Öcalan, 2012: 40).  
This gives rise to important questions; how was the republic established and realized? And 
was this a democratic move? 
 
6. Discussion Chapter  
 
In this chapter, I will have a theoretical discussion on whether democratic confederalism is 
more democratic and an alternative system to the nation-state, a state based on 
nationalism, in Turkey. The discussion will be based on the concepts of nation-state, 
democratic confederalism and democracy as described in the theoretical chapter. The 
contextual chapter and points from the conclusion of the analysis will also be used as 
substance for the arguments. 
 
6.1 Nation-state and Democracy 
 
The foundation of the Republic was a long process. Though changes were made and 
modern reforms were implemented already during the Ottoman Empire, the modernization 
process did not succeed. The Empire was underdeveloped and the people were 
dissatisfied with the situation. The pursuit of the Turkish identity and the notion of Turkish 
racial superiority began as a reaction against the aging Ottoman system. The Young 
 
 
Turks, a secular and Western-oriented political movement jump-started the nation-state 
building-process. The aim vision was to build a new state based on Turkish national purity 
and in a state model resembled Western European countries, with economic growth and 
democracy. The theoretical thought of the nation concepts, ethnically based nation-states 
and race thinking was obtained from Germany, France and Italy. When the republic was 
established, they carried out a program of radical reform and structural change. They 
abolished the monarchy, banished the dynasty, and set up a secular republic. 
Nation-state is based on nationalism. In the urge of modernizing the remnants of the 
Ottoman Empire, the Turks, who was the largest group and the elite under the Ottoman 
Empire, decided to build a nation-state based on Turkish nationalism. Though the old, 
multi-religious and multi-ethnic Empire was dissolved, the new modern borders of Turkey 
still surrounded many religious and non-Turkish minorities. When there was so many 
different groups within the new borders, was Turkish nationalism the right order to 
implement in the new republic of Turkey? 
This national-state building resulted in anti-democratic reforms based on Turkish 
nationalism. The Turkish elite, who had lost its previous legitimacy with the dissolution of 
the Empire, had to create the idea of the nation-state as a way to achieve loyalty among 
the people. But instead of achieving the loyalty of the people, they betrayed them, the 
people who were their greatest allies. They banned the two groups, who represented a 
great part of the society, from the Grand National Assembly of Turkey and took away their 
right to be a part of the decision-making. One of the most important criteria for democracy 
is participation/co-determination. The aim with this criterion is to prevent the possibility of a 
small group of members of the society to dominate the discussion and decision-making, 
and possibly exclude and limit the discussion and decision-making to only a few members 
of the society. The new republic was incapable of fulfilling this criterion. The Ummah and 
Kurds were excluded and could not control the agenda. This was why the anti-Islamic and 
anti-Kurdish reforms passed through and was implemented. These two groups were not 
political equal with the republic elite. They were taken away their basic civil rights. The 
discussion about what democracy really means has always been abstract and ambiguous. 
This is because democracy is not a fixed and finite size, but a more elusive concept, which 
is essentially influenced by subjectivity. And this is why Robert A. Dahl see the criteria he 
has sat as an ideal of democracy and measuring tool. According to Dahl, there is no state 
 
 
that has lived up to the criteria he has set, and he assumes that there is not going to be so 
in the future. However, the criteria are also a form of civil rights that must be assigned to 
all members of society. Factors such as sex, color, age should not be able to restrict these 
rights. "To the extent that any of these requirements are violated, members are not political 
equals." (Dahl, 2000, p. 34f). The new system did not represent all groups' interests, but 
rather discriminated those who did not fit into their new nationalist and secular state and 
order.  
 
6.2 Democratic Confederalism - an alternative to the nation-state?  
 
With the case of Turkey, the republican elite decided to implement a state-system based 
on the westerns notions of nationalism and secularism. The discussion above shows that 
these western concepts did not succeed in their implementation, as they did not represent 
the interest of the people but rather the interests of the elite, why they were not 
democratic. This system gives an ethnic group superiority and oppresses those who is not 
within this superior group. 
Even though I have not examined the historical events after the Second World War in 
Turkey, the consequences of this anti-democratic system is still obvious today. The 
assimilation programs and policies that were implemented in the beginning of foundation 
did result in great Kurdish resistance. The resistance is still ongoing with the leading of the 
PKK. The PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan regards the foundation of the PKK as a product of 
the nation-state and the consequences of it.   
The republican elites strive to finish the Ottoman Empire chapter, and start a new one was 
a big mistake. They forgot that the same groups who lived under the Empire still existed 
within the new borders. The idea that nationalization/turkicification is the solution to all 
social issues was wrong. Clearly the idea of nation-state in Turkey does not work. There 
was no respect to the historical past and culture when implementing the system in Turkey.  
By contrast to the nation-state, a democratic confederalism is multilingual, multi-religious, 
multi-ethnic and multi-cultural, encompassing groups and individuals with different 
interests. It does not base itself on the sameness of citizens and groups. It rejects the 
question between state and nation, viewing each as different formation. In democratic 
confederalism all groups, religious communities and civil society is considered to be as 
 
 
important as the citizens (Öcalan, 2012: 22). Democratic confederalism is open towards 
other political groups and fractions. It is flexible, multicultural, anti-monopolistic, and 
consensus-oriented. In theory, this actually fulfills Dahl’s criterion of no exclusion and 
equal rights to participation/co-determination.  
In contrast to a centralist and bureaucratic understanding of administration and exercise of 
power, confederalism poses a type of political self-administration where all groups of the 
society and all cultural identities can express themselves in local meetings, general 
conventions and councils. This understanding of democracy opens the political space to all 
strata of the society and allows for the formation of different and diverse political groups. In 
this way it also advances the political integration of the society as a whole (Öcalan, 2011: 
26). According to Öcalan, terms like federalism or self-administration, as they can be found 
in liberal democracies, needs to be conceived anew. Essentially, they should not be 
conceived as hierarchical levels of the administration of the nation-state, but rather as 
central tools of social expression and participation.  
The creation of an operational level where all kinds of social and political groups, religious 
communities, or intellectual tendencies can express themselves directly in all local 
decision-making processes can also be called participative democracy. The stronger the 
participation the more powerful is this kind of democracy (Öcalan, 2011: 26).  
According to Öcalan, this idea of radical democracy – radical in the sense that it tries to 
develop the concept of democracy beyond nation and state – is developed in two projects: 
one for the democratic republic and one for democratic confederalism. 
The concepts of democratic republic, is Öcalan’s contribution to how to solve the issues in 
Turkey that have raised from the nation-state, comprehends a reform of the Republic of 
Turkey. It aims at the disassociation of democracy from nationalism. 
Originally, in the eighteenth century, democracy was formulated in terms of citizen’s rights 
and a rule of everyone by everyone. In the course of the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries, modernity, however, lost its content of radical democracy and acquired a 
cultural meaning, referring to a unique people. A vein in modern thought emerged, holding 
that cultural homogeneity is a requirement of the modern state and erupts in the form of 
nationalism (Jongerden & Akkaya, 2011: 154f). 
 
 
This “national” condition of modernity is exclusive and intolerant, dictating that people who 
do not have the right cultural characteristics only can choose assimilation. In Turkey 
Kemalism became formulated as a project of modernization in cultural terms, resulting the 
harsh assimilation politics and programs towards the Kurds. With the concept of 
democratic republic, Öcalan tries to return to an understanding of democracy in terms of 
citizen’s rights. The idea of democratic confederalism is defined as a model for democratic 
self-government. This project of democratic confederalism builds on the self-government 
of local communities and is organized in the form of open councils, town councils, local 
parliaments and larger congresses. The citizens themselves are agents of this kind of self-
government. 
The social actors, which are each for itself federative units, are the germ cells of 
participative democracy. They can combine and associate into new groups and 
confederations according to the situation. Each of the political units involved in 
participative democracy is essentially democratic. In this way, what we call democracy 
then is the application of democratic processes of decision-making from the local level to 
the global level in the framework of a continuous political process. This process will affect 
the structure of the social web of the society in contrast to the striving for homogeneity of 
the nation-state, a construct that can only be realized by force thus bringing about the loss 
of freedom. 
Looking at the Middle East today, one cannot ignore the conflicts and problems.  
If we look at Iraq, there are three major groups fighting for power in the country, the 
Sunnis, Shias and Kurds. The Kurds have achieved autonomy, but they often experience 
conflicts with the central government in Baghdad. The central government is ruled by the 
Shias and this has had consequences for the Sunnis, as these two groups of Muslims 
have sectarian disagreements. This has resulted in the suppression of the Sunnis. Iraq 
was also established as nation-state based on Arab nationalism, but like in Turkey, it has 
not worked. It has not managed to bring together the various groups in the country under 
the flag of arab nationalism. And every time one of the groups comes to power, they try to 
exclusively defend their own group's interests and thus suppress the other groups. 
All over Middle East one can experience these problems. When they created these nation-
states they did not consider that these lands, that were divided in to modern nation-states, 
was multi-religious and multi-ethnical. Democratic confederalism could be an actual 
 
 
alternative to the nation-state in the Middle East. The fact that every part of the society can 
participate in the decision-making could prevent all these problems and conflicts we are 
experiencing in the Middle East.  
Also, although nationalism had founded its way to the Ottoman Empire, the only 
perception of state the peoples, except the elite, knew was the state-system of the 
Ottoman Empire, where they had autonomy and cultural rights. Community and unity was 
not based on ethnicity.  
According to Öcalan, in the Middle East, democracy cannot be imposed by the capitalist 
system and its imperial powers, which only damage democracy. The propagation of grass-
roots democracy is elementary. It is the only approach that can handle with the diverse 
ethnical groups, religions and class differences. It also goes together with the traditional 
confederate structure of the society. 
6.3 Part Conclusion 
 
The nation-state’s emphasize on nationalism has resulted in undemocratic reforms, that 
has oppressed the groups that did not belong to the ruling elite and those who did not 
have the right cultural and ethnical characteristics. 
With the idea of democratic confederalism Öcalan suggests a new system that can 
represent the interest of all the groups within society. Democratic confederalism, in theory, 
seems to be a more democratic system that includes all part of society and thus is an 
alternative to the nation-states in the Middle East.  
  
7. Conclusion 
In this project, I examined if democratic confederalism is an alternative to the nation-state 
in the Middle East. To answer my problem formulation I made a case study with Turkey as 
a case. This project consists of two part: an analysis and a discussion. In the analysis, I 
examined which consequences the nation-state building and the structural, political and 
social reforms that were implemented in the state-building process had for the different 
minorities in Turkey. In this part of my research, I concluded that these reforms had severe 
consequences for those minorities that were not ethnic Turks or did not have the same 
ideological and political persuasion as the ruling elite. With the secularization process, that 
 
 
began at the foundation of the Republic, the Islamic Ummah lost their legitimacy and was 
therefore excluded from the decision-making. The Kurds, who wanted autonomy, were 
exposed to assimilation policies and programs (Turkification). Their basic cultural and 
human rights were taken away. They were as well excluded from the decision-making. 
That they could not participate in the decision-making meant that their interests were never 
represented by the ruling elite.  
In the second part of the project, I made a theoretical discussion of whether democratic 
confederalism is an alternative to nation-state. First I discussed how democratic the 
nation-state is by using Dahl’s criteria for democracy as a measurement tool. Second, I did 
the same with democratic confederalism, and finally discussed if democratic confederalism 
is an alternative to nation state. In the part I concluded that the nation-state was not a 
democratic system (in Turkey). The implementation of state-system in Turkey based on 
nationalism shows that it in practice it is not democratic The nation-state’s emphasize on 
nationalism has resulted in undemocratic reforms, that has oppressed the groups that did 
not belong to the ruling elite and those who did not have the right cultural and ethnical 
characteristics. 
The idea of democratic confederalism, in theory, is more democratic and thus represent all 
groups within society, as this system does not discriminate any ethnicity, religion, sex, 
class or ideology. The right to participation and self-determination could solve many of the 
problems we are seeing in the Middle East today. With the historical background of the 
Middle East, democratic confederliams seems to be an alternative to modern nation-
states. 
Perspective 
PYD, PKK’s sister party in Syria, chose, in accordance with the PKK’s vision, to implement 
Öcalan’s ideas of democratic confederalism. In this project, I have examined the nation-
state building in Turkey, and it could be interesting to compare Turkey’s process and 
reforms with those in Western Kurdistan (Syria). How does democratic confederalism work 
in practice, and is it as democratic as the theoretical discussion concluded and as Öcalan 
claim.  
 
 
It could also be interesting to examine if PKK as a party has pushed the Turkish 
government towards democratic reforms. The fact that there is ongoing negotiations 
between the government and PKK shows that the country is on its way to a more 
democratic future, but whether this is because of the PKK struggle or the AKP’s (the ruling 
party) politics should be examined.  
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